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I. Introduction
Both the international community and the United States continued to expand their policy
and enforcement efforts globally in 2005, culminating with the entry into force of the
United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC)' on December 14, 2005. The
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U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) showed a pattern of agreeing to defer the prosecution
of companies that voluntarily reported violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA).2 The Organization of American States, Council of Europe, and Organisation for




In 2005, the DOJ and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed a number
of FCPA cases where the DOJ entered into deferred prosecution agreements, the SEC
entered into consent orders, it seems, as a result of the companies' voluntary disclosures,
their subsequent remedial efforts, and their agreement to continue cooperating with the
government's investigations. These cases may mark a continuing trend toward rewarding
voluntary disclosures and cooperation with less punitive resolutions. The settling compa-
nies, however, were required to: (1) make full disclosure of the wrongdoing; (2) disgorge
illicitly obtained profits or benefits; (3) pay fines and penalties; (4) implement or strengthen
compliance programs and internal controls; (5) actively cooperate in the prosecution of
employees, agents, and possibly foreign government officials; and (6) take other remedial
measures.
Unfortunately, even for companies that undertake to cooperate fully and to reform and
improve their governance systems and controls, there are no guarantees that the govern-
ment or the courts will not impose penalties that are more severe than expected. These
companies may still face additional sanctions or enforcement actions from other federal or
state agencies, as well as from foreign governments. The benefits from a negotiated reso-
lution of a government investigation may be greatest in ancillary areas of a company's
business. A company seen to be rectifying past mistakes may fare better with shareholders,
consumers, lenders, regulators, and others. However, although voluntary disclosure and
cooperation may assist in resolving matters with the government, companies should not
discount the significant distractions and possible costs associated with shareholder class
action and derivative lawsuits that may be filed once possible violations are disclosed.
In addition to the FCPA cases discussed below, it is clear from SEC filings that a number
of other companies are under investigation or are conducting their own investigations into
possible FCPA violations. Such companies include Baker Hughes, Lucent Technologies,
Accenture, Ltd., Bristol Myers Squibb, Consumers Energy Co., Halliburton, Marathon Oil
Corp., Offshore Logistics, Teleglobe, and United Defense Industries, Inc.
B. CASES
1. DPC (Tianjin) Ltd.
On June 20, 2005, in the Central District of California, DPC (Tianjin) Ltd., a wholly
owned Chinese subsidiary of Diagnostic Products Corporation, pled guilty to violating the
FCPA's anti-bribery provisions by paying $1.6 million in corrupt commissions to doctors
and procurement officials of state-owned hospitals in China to induce them to purchase
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), 78dd-I (2000).
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medical products sold by DPC Tianjin. In connection with the guilty plea, the court ordered
DPC Tianjin to pay a stipulated fine of $2 million. Concurrently, Diagnostic Products
entered into a consent order with the SEC in which the SEC found that Diagnostic Prod-
ucts had violated the FCPA's anti-bribery, books and records, and internal control provi-
sions.3 Although the SEC took into account the subsidiary's agreement to pay the criminal
fine, it nevertheless required the parent company to pay $2.8 million, including disgorge-
ment of just over $2 million. Both agreements required the companies to retain an inde-
pendent consultant or monitor charged with reviewing each company's FCPA compliance
programs. Despite the fact that the SEC's order states that Diagnostic Products took re-
medial action once it learned of the payments, that action was too late to save the parent
company from civil liability.4 The circumstances here, specifically that the payments had
continued for eleven years before they were discovered, suggest that the SEC found that
Diagnostic Products' internal controls, at least with respect to FCPA compliance, were
wholly ineffective, perhaps to the extent that their absence established willful blindness.'
2. GE/In Vision
On February 14, 2005, the SEC settled civil FCPA charges against GE InVision, Inc., a
subsidiary of General Electric (GE).6 InVision, a California-based manufacturer of airport
explosive detection devices, was acquired by GE after the conduct that led to the criminal
and civil charges had occurred. Before completing the merger, InVision and GE made a
voluntary disclosure to the government. According to the government's pleadings, on three
separate occasions between June 2002 and June 2004, InVision personnel authorized pay-
ments to foreign sales agents and distributors, while aware of a high probability that those
persons had offered or made payments of something of value or made payments to foreign
government officials in order to obtain or retain business for InVision. InVision improperly
recorded the payments to the agents and distributors in its books and records and failed to
devise and maintain a system of internal controls sufficient to ensure FCPA compliance.
As a result of InVision's disclosures, the DOJ and SEC opened investigations focused
upon InVision's apparent violations of the FCPA anti-bribery, books and records, and in-
ternal controls provisions. Eventually, the agencies entered into the following agreements
with InVision:
3. The DOJ charged DPC Tianjin with acting as an agent of its parent, and its guilty plea was entered under
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l, the provision of the FCPA applicable to issuers, rather than 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3. Section
78dd-3 was added in 1998 and prohibits any foreign person from committing an act in violation of the FCPA
while in the United States. This charging decision may reflect the government's perception that the subsidiary
was acting on behalf of the parent or that the government may not have believed that DPC Tianjin engaged
in sufficient violative activities in the United States and therefore proceeded on an agency theory. See, Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, DPC(Tianjin) Ltd. Charged With Violating the Foreign Corruption Practices
Act (May 20, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/May/05-crm-282.htm.
4. Under the FCPA, "[w]hen knowledge of the existence of a particular circumstance is required for an
offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of the existence of such
circumstance, unless the person actually believes that such circumstance does not exist." 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-
I (f)(2)(B) (2000).
5. Id.
6. Litigation Release No. 19078, U.S. Securities and Exchange Comm'n, SEC Settles Charges Against
InVision Technologies for $1.1 Million for Violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Feb. 14, 2005),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19078.htm.
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" DOJ (criminal) agreement: On December 3, 2004, in return for DOJ's agreement to
defer prosecution, prior to the merger with GE,7 InVision agreed to accept responsi-
bility for its misconduct; pay an $800,000 fine; negotiate a settlement with the SEC;
and cooperate with DOJ's investigation. Since the DOJ was aware of the pending
acquisition by GE, the DOJ and GE entered into a separate agreement, in which GE
agreed to ensure compliance with and enhance InVision's FCPA compliance programs
and controls.8
" SEC (civil) agreement: In a civil action by the SEC9 on February 14, 2005, InVision,
now a subsidiary of GE, without admitting or denying liability, agreed to disgorge
$589,000 in profits from the sale of explosive detection machines in China, plus interest
and a $500,000 civil penalty. InVision was ordered to cease-and-desist from future
violations and to retain an independent consultant to ensure the effectiveness of its
FCPA compliance program.
At first glance, the InVision matter appears somewhat atypical in that InVision admitted
that it had violated the FCPA through the actions of a Chinese distributor. The govern-
ment's pleadings disclose, however, that InVision was advised that the distributor intended
to use funds provided by InVision to pay for foreign travel for Chinese officials, for the
purpose of assisting InVision to avoid a threatened financial penalty from a Chinese gov-
ernment agency. Thus, InVision was at least a co-conspirator in, if not the principal behind,
the distributor's misconduct. The matter is also somewhat unusual in that GE-which was
not involved in the misconduct and only acquired InVision after it had settled all charges-
entered into a separate agreement to develop and enforce an FCPA compliance program
at InVision. This is a different mechanism than was used to resolve at least two prior FCPA
matters involving a subsequent acquisition. In those matters, the acquirer obtained an FCPA
Opinion providing it with a safe harbor if certain representations made to the DOJ, based
on its pre-acquisition due diligence, were accurate. 10 In other cases (see, e.g., Titan, below),
where a potential acquirer discovered misconduct in the course of due diligence, the ac-
quirer terminated acquisition efforts rather than acquire the FCPA liability.
3. Micrus
On March 2, 2005, the Department of Justice announced that Micrus Corporation, a
privately-held company that develops and sells medical devices, had entered into a two-
year deferred prosecution agreement to settle FCPA charges.' The investigation disclosed
that Micrus had paid more than $105,000 to doctors employed at public hospitals in France,
Turkey, Spain, and Germany, in return for the hospitals' purchases of Micrus medical prod-
7. Press Release, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, InVision Technologies, Inc. Enters into Agreement with the United
States (Dec. 6, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/December/O4-crm-780.htm.
8. InVision also agreed that, if the merger with GE was not completed by a date certain, it would retain
an independent, outside law firm to serve as a compliance monitor. Because the merger was completed by the
target date, GE retained the compliance monitor. Id.
9. Litigation Release No. 19078, supra note 6.
10. See, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, FCPA Opinion Procedure Release 2003-01, (Jan. 15,2003), available athttp://
www.usdoj.gov/criminallfraud/fcpa/o0301.hun; U.S. Dep't ofJustice, FCPA Opinion Procedure Relase 2004-
02 (July 12, 2004) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminalfraud/fcpa/o0402.htm.
11. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Micrus Corporation Enters Into Agreement to Resolve Potential
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Liability (Mar. 2, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/March/
05_crm_090.htm.
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ucts. The payments were concealed as stock options, honoraria, and commissions. Addi-
tionally, Micrus had made $250,000 in payments that were not authorized under the laws
of the various foreign states.
As part of its agreement, Micrus and its Swiss subsidiary, Micrus, S.A., agreed to: (1)
accept responsibility for their misconduct; (2) fully disclose all actual or suspected FCPA
violations to the DOJ; (3) agree to a statement of facts setting forth the violations; (4) pay
a $450,000 penalty; and (5) adopt an FCPA compliance program. Further, Micrus, which
is not an issuer and therefore is not subject to the "books and records" and "internal con-
trols" provisions of the FCPA, was required to implement such controls and to retain an
independent monitor to review its controls.
4. Monsanto Company
On January 6, 2005, the DOJ filed a criminal information in the District of Columbia
charging the Monsanto Company with one count of bribery and one count of falsifying its
books and records.12 The DOJ and Monsanto entered into a three-year deferred prosecu-
tion agreement and Monsanto entered into a consent order with the SEC. 3 Monsanto
agreed to pay a $1 million penalty to the DOJ and a $500,000 civil penalty to the SEC.
According to the pleadings, throughout 2001 Monsanto had unsuccessfully sought the re-
peal of an Indonesian regulation that required environmental impact studies for a variety
of genetically-modified crops. In late 200 1, a senior Monsanto manager authorized an In-
donesian consultant company to submit false invoices and made false representations to
other Monsanto employees to justify payment of those invoices. Thereafter, the consultant
company withdrew $50,000 in cash and delivered it to an Indonesian official in return for
a promise to repeal the regulation.
4
5. Titan Corporation
On March 1, 2005, Titan Corporation, a San Diego-based military intelligence and com-
munications company, pled guilty 5 to one count of FCPA bribery, one count of falsifying
its books and records, and one count of aiding or assisting in the filing of a false tax return,
in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2). Titan was sentenced to pay a criminal fine of$13 million
on the FCPA bribery count and was ordered to serve three years of supervised probation.
As a condition of its probation, Titan was ordered to institute a strict compliance program
and to implement a system of internal controls designed to prevent future FCPA violations.
Titan also entered into a consent decree with the SEC, 6 agreeing to cease-and-desist from
future FCPA violations, enter into a financial settlement comprised of disgorgement and
prejudgment interest of $15,479,000, and retain an independent consultant to review Ti-
12. Press Release, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Monsanto Company Charged with Bribing Indonesian Government
Official: Prosecution Deferred for Three Years (Jan. 6, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/
January/05 _crm_008.htm.
13. Id.
14. According to the SEC's Order, Monsanto's Indonesian management team also created a secret fund
from which to finance over $700,000 in illicit payments to at least 140 Indonesian officials and their family
members by over-invoicing transactions and creating ghost invoices. Id.
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tan's FCPA policies and procedures. The aggregate penalty of over $28 million is the largest
FCPA penalty imposed to date.
According to the pleadings, beginning in 1998, Titan and its subsidiaries entered into an
agreement with the government of Benin to build and operate a wireless telephone network,
which included a substantial management fee. To secure and retain this business, Titan
engaged an agent who claimed to have close ties to the then-president of Benin. Titan paid
the agent hundreds of thousands of dollars for consulting services that were not documented
and do not appear to have been performed. In January 2001, Titan began making improper
payments, totaling over $3.5 million, to the Benin agent for the purpose of influencing the
upcoming election in Benin and ensuring the continued support of the then-president for
Titan's contract. At Titan's request, the agent submitted over $2 million in false invoices
to Titan. Titan knowingly falsified its books and records to conceal the illicit payments.
The investigation into Titan's FCPA violations terminated a potential $1.6 billion merger
between Titan and Lockheed Corporation-Lockheed withdrew its offer when Titan was
unable to timely resolve the government's investigation. Both the SEC and the DOJ plead-
ings noted that Titan and its subsidiaries had an almost complete lack of FCPA controls.
The SEC's report highlighted its view that Titan's false representations in its proxy state-
ments concerning its purported compliance with the FCPA, as well as its failure to correct
these disclosures, affected the "total mix of information" available to investors, and the
failure to correct could be deemed to have violated sections 10(b) and 14(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.1"
6. Yaw Osei Amoako
On September 1, 2005, the SEC filed a complaint against Yaw Osei Amoako, 18 the former
Regional Director for Africa of ITXC Corp. (now part of Teleglobe International Holdings
Ltd.), alleging that he had bribed a senior official of Nigerian Telecommunications Ltd.
(Nitel), an instrumentality of the Nigerian government. 19 The Complaint alleges that in
mid-2002, Amoako offered to make a Nitel official an agent of ITXC, paying him a retainer
and a portion of profits, if Nitel obtained a license to place telephone calls to individuals
and businesses in Nigeria. After ITXC received the license, it allegedly paid the Nitel official
approximately $167,000. As of the date of publication, Amoako has not settled with the
SEC, and trial is pending. Teleglobe, the new owner of ITXC, which previously disclosed
an internal investigation involving FCPA allegations, has recently announced a definitive
agreement to be acquired by another company. As in the other merger cases discussed
herein, the acquirer will presumably either demand that Teleglobe resolve this issue prior
to the closing or the SEC's complaint will scuttle the merger.
17. Exchange Act Release No. 51283, Securities and Exchange Comm'n, Report of Investigation Pursuant
to Section 2 l(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on Potential Exchange
Act Section 10(b) and Section 14(a) liability (Mar. 1, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/invest
report/34-51238.htn.
•18. Litigation Release No. 19356, U.S. Securities and Exchange Comm'n, SEC Sues Former Regional
Director of ITXC Corp. for Violations of the Anti-Bribery Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(Sept. 1, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lrl9356.htm.
19. Allegations that bribes were paid to officials of Nitel are also the focus of a highly-publicizedinvestigation
involving another company. To date, no charges have been brought in that matter, although the authorities
have conducted searches of the homes of both a U.S. congressman and a Nigerian diplomat. Id.
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7. United States v. Kozeny
On October 6, 2005, the Southern District of New York unsealed a twenty-seven-count
indictment alleging that Viktor Kozeny, Frederic Bourke, Jr., and David Pinkerton had
conspired to violate and violated the FCPA, the Travel Act, and federal money laundering
statutes as part of a scheme to bribe senior government officials in Azerbaijan in an unsuc-
cessful attempt to induce that government to privatize its oil industry.2" The indictment
further alleges that Bourke and Pinkerton made false statements to the FBI. Three other
individuals have already pled guilty to conspiracy, FCPA, and money laundering offenses
relating to this scheme.2
According to the indictment, from mid-1997 through 1999, Kozeny devised a scheme to
gain control of the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) by illicitly
investing in privatization vouchers and options issued by the Azeri government through an
entity called Oily Rock Group, Inc. The bribes allegedly included payments of millions of
dollars in cash, gifts, travel, and a promise to provide Azeri officials with two-thirds of Oily
Rock's profits. According to the indictment, Bourke had invested $8 million, and Pinkerton
had caused AIG to invest $15 million in Oily Rock. Bourke and Pinkerton each allegedly
knew of the bribes and believed that Kozeny had obtained non-public information con-
cerning SOCAR, including information regarding the timing of the privatization.
The government charged all three defendants as domestic concerns or, in Kozeny's case,
as an agent of Bourke, Pinkerton, and Oily Rock's or Minaret's other shareholders and
investors who were U.S. citizens or entities.22 Kozeny was arrested by the Bahamian gov-
ernment, and the U.S. government is seeking Kozeny's extradition.
M. Enforcement Actions Abroad
A. ANTI-BRIBERY
1. Costa Rica
The Costa Rican Attorney General and National Congress are investigating allegations
that a local subsidiary of communications solutions provider Alcatel made payments to state
and local officials in Costa Rica and representatives of the state-owned telephone company,
ICE, in order to secure contracts.2" The Costa Rican Attorney General's Office and ICE
have also filed lawsuits against Alcatel CIT, seeking compensation for damages caused by
20. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Attorney, S. Dist. of N.Y., U.S. Announces Charges in Massive Scheme
to Bribe Senior Government Officials in the Republic of Azerbaijan (Oct. 6, 2005), available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/usao/nys/Press%20Releases/October%2005/Kozeny%20et%20al.%201ndictment%20PR.pdf.
21. Id.
22. Id. The government did not charge Kozeny (a Czech national and Irish citizen, residing in the Bahamas)
under 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3 that permits the U.S. government to prosecute foreign nationals who cause an act
to be done in violation of the FCPA while in the territory of the United States, perhaps because the only acts
alleged in the indictment involving acts in the United States occurred prior to the November 10, 1998 effective
date of the enactment of § 78dd-3.
23. See generally, Former Costa Rican President Freed Pending Trial, EFE WoRLDes NEws SERVICE, Oct. 14, 2005;
Alcatel, Report of a Foreign Issuer (Form 6-K), Sept. 30, 2003, available at http://www.alcatel.es/finance/
reports/2003/une2003_6K.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2006); Former Costa Rica's President Figueres Says He is Victim
of a Political Game, LA NAcIoN, Feb. 10, 2005; Costa Rica: Scandals Hit the PLN, CARIBBEAN & CEcr, Am. REP.,
RC-04-11, Nov. 16, 2004.
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the alleged payments.2 4 Former Costa Rican Presidents Jose Maria Figueres and Miguel
Angel Rodriguez have been summoned or jailed as a result of the investigation. Rodriguez
was recently released from house arrest but must remain in the country while the criminal
case remains pending. Figueres, who lives in Switzerland, admits that he accepted more
than $900,000 in payments from Alcatel, but maintains the funds were received for legiti-
mate advice that he provided to the French company. As a result of its own investigation
into the matter, Alcatel fired Edgar Valverde, the president of Alcatel de Costa Rica, and
an executive of a French subsidiary. The company has also announced it is pursuing criminal
actions against Valverde and local consultants and employees believed to be involved in the
scheme.
2. France
French authorities are investigating a consortium consisting of Technip, a French com-
pany, Kellogg, Brown & Root, a subsidiary of Halliburton, and Italian and Japanese com-
panies, for allegedly paying bribes to Nigerian government officials in connection with the
construction of a natural gas liquefaction complex on Bonny Island .2 The consortium,
through a separate entity, retained Tristar, a Gibraltar company, to assist with the project
and, allegedly, paid it approximately $180 million in fees and commissions. Tristar is re-
portedly owned by Jeffrey Tesler, an English lawyer with ties to the late former Nigerian
leader General Sani Abacha. Tesler is also reportedly quite close to Olusegun Obasanjo,
the current leader of Nigeria. Published reports suggest that a significant part of the funds
allegedly paid to Tristar may have found its way to various Nigerian government officials.
In 2004, Nigeria's House of Representatives Committee on Public Petition launched its
own investigation into the alleged payment of bribes by the joint venture.
3. Germany
German federal authorities reportedly have joined U.S. criminal and civil investigations
of DaimlerChrysler regarding alleged violations of the FCPA and Germany's own trans-
national bribery law by the auto giant's Mercedes business unit.26 Press reports indicate that
Mercedes may have maintained numerous slush funds used to make payments to foreign
government officials, and that these funds were not properly recorded on DaimlerChrysler's
financial statements. Some of these payments are reported to have been made in 2002 to
Cotecna, the Geneva-based company that was retained by the United Nations (U.N.) to
inspect and process shipments to Iraq under the U.N.'s Oil-For-Food program. Daimler-
Chrysler allegedly paid Cotecna representatives to process DaimlerChrysler shipments to
Iraq ahead of other shippers. Munich prosecutors are also reportedly investigating German
subsidiaries of pharmaceutical giant Bristol Myers-Squibb. The company disclosed late last
year that the SEC had launched an informal inquiry into the activities of its German sub-
24. Alcatel, Report of a Foreign Issuer, supra note 23.
25. Mike Oduniyi, Halliburton: Court Orders Access to Suspects' Account, ALL AFRICA, Jan. 13, 2005, http://
www.allafrica.com; Julio Godoy, France: Former Public Officals Accused of Corruption, INTER PRESS SERVICE,
Oct. 20, 2005.
26. Press Release, U.S. Securities & Exchange Comm'n, Bristol-Myers Squibb Company Agrees to Pay
$150 Million to Settle Fraud Charges (Aug. 4. 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-105.htn;
US. Justice Department investigates Mercedes corruption, ACENCE FRANCE PREssE, Aug. 5, 2005, available at http://
www.afp.com/english/home; U.S. Probes Mercedes Over Bribery Allegation, DATAmONITOR, Aug. 8, 2005,
http://www.datamonitor.com.
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sidiaries and employees-an inquiry that the company believes may involve potential FCPA
violations and violations of German law.
4. India
Xerox recently disclosed that an independent investigator appointed by the Indian Min-
istry of Company Affairs has completed an investigation into allegations that its Indian
subsidiary, Xerox Modicorp Ltd. (now known as Xerox India Ltd.), misappropriated funds,
inaccurately recorded payments on company books, and made improper payments "in con-
nection with sales to government customers."27 According to Xerox, the investigator's re-
port alleges that Xerox Modicorp's senior officials were aware of the misappropriation of
funds and improper payments and stresses the need for further inquiry into potential crim-
inal acts. Copies of the findings have been forwarded to the DOJ and the SEC.
5. Indonesia
Indonesia's Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) announced in January that it
would begin an investigation into allegations that Monsanto made improper payments to
Indonesian government officials, as described above.2 s The KPK announcement came just
days after Monsanto settled the DOJ and the SEC enforcement proceedings.
6. Italy
Immucor, Inc., a U.S. publicly held global in vitro diagnostics company, reported that
authorities in Milan are conducting a criminal investigation of the company's president and
Italian subsidiary based on allegations that Immucor and other companies made improper
payments to an Italian doctor, and possibly other doctors, in exchange for favorable contract
awards by the hospital.19 An Immucor internal investigation found that payments were made
to the Italian doctor in question for his services, but were not improper. However, the
payments were not properly recorded and therefore constituted a violation of the FCPA
books and records provisions. Immucor voluntarily reported the violation to the SEC in
2004. The same internal investigation also found that payments had been made to another
doctor and that the payments may have led to the introduction of equipment into that
doctor's hospital and possibly other hospitals.
7. Lesotbo
Lesotho began the trial in its sixth corruption prosecution arising from the Lesotho
Highlands Water Project (one of the largest dam projects in the world) against Impregilo,
Italy's largest construction company, on five charges of bribery for allegedly paying over
$1 million in bribes to the head of the project.30 Two individuals and three companies have
already been convicted for their participation in the scandal.
8. Thailand
The Thai government announced the results of its investigation regarding bribes alleg-
edly paid to Thai officials in connection with the sale of baggage screening machines in-
27. Xerox Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 31 (Oct. 28, 2005).
28. Muninggar Sri Saraswati, KPK to Investigate Monsanto Bribery Case, THEJAKARTA PosT,Jan. 10,2005,
http://www.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid = 200501 10.B02.
29. Immucor, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Oct. 19, 2005).
30. Thabo Thakalekoala, Italian Construction Company Charged with Bribery in Lesotho Highlands Water Project,
AssoctATD PRESS, Mar. 2, 2005.
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tended for the new Bangkok airport." The bribery allegations were related to the InVision
Technologies FCPA investigation that was settled in the United States at the end of 2004.
The government-appointed investigation committee cleared Thai politicians and officials
of the charges, claiming it had found no evidence to support the allegation that the officials
accepted bribes or kickbacks in connection with the purchase of the baggage equipment.
However, a Thai Senate investigation committee has accused executives of the New Bang-
kok International Airport Co. of breaking Thai procurement and anti-corruption laws by
accepting bribes in connection with the purchase of baggage-handling equipment. The head
of the Senate investigation committee announced that its findings would be sent to the
president.
9. United Kingdom
The Times (U.K.) reported in August 2005, that seventeen cases of potential bribery and
corruption had been referred to the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), the independent arm of
the U.K. government responsible for investigating and prosecuting acts of fraud, since April
2004.32 Four of the seventeen cases actively being investigated by the SFO involve allega-
tions that British companies paid bribes to foreign public officials. BAE Systems is one of
the companies currently under scrutiny by the Ministry of Defence Police and the SFO.
Investigators are looking into allegations that BAE paid millions of dollars in bribes to
Saudi government officials in connection with lucrative defense contracts.
B. ANTI-CORRUPTION
1. Nigeria
The Government of Nigeria achieved a major success in its efforts to recover the esti-
mated $2.2 billion" in public funds stolen by the late General Sani Abacha during his rule.
In July 2005, the Nigerian Court of Appeal dismissed a suit34 by Abacha's family to halt
efforts to recover the stolen funds. Abacha had challenged the forfeitures on the grounds
that the family had been denied due process by the international mutual legal assistance
process used to freeze and seize assets overseas. Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Switzerland,
the United States, and the United Kingdom have all been participating in the global effort
to recover the Abacha funds, with the assistance of the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime.3
31. Sutin Wannabovorn, Thai Government Probe Finds No Payoffs to Officials in Airport Scanner Deal, AP
ALERT-BUSINESS, June 8, 2005; Thai Government Investigation Reveals No Bribes to Officials, AIRLINE INDUSTRY
INFo., June 9, 2005, available at http://www.allbusiness.com/periodicals/article/442950-1.html; US Court Post-
pones Hearing on Shareholders Suit Against In ,ision, THtA PRESS REP., Aug 1, 2005; Thai Panel Says Officials
Violated Anti-Corruption Laws in Purchase of Scanners, WoRtD NEws CONNECTION, Oct. 16, 2005.
32. Frances Gibb, Companies Face Investigation Into 'Bribery'Abroad, THE TIMES (U.K), Aug. 1,2005, available
at http://www.business.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,9063-1716713,00.html; Michael Harrison, Hole in BAE
Pension Fund Grows by Pounds 1.2bn, THE INDEPENDENT (U.K.), Feb. 25, 2005, http://www.findarticles.com/p/
articles/mi-qn4158/is_20050225/ainI 1054925; Robert Winnert & David Leppard, TheDefence Firm and the
Slush Fund, SUNDAY TIMES (U.K.), July 25, 2004, at 5.
33. This estimate, one of the lowest, is from the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime. U.N. Office on Drugs
and Crime, Asset Recovery Project in Nigeria, Feb. 12, 2006, available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/
corruption-projects-nigeria-project2.hunl (other sources estimate Abacha may have stolen as much as $5
billion).
34. Ise-Oluwa Ige, Abacha Tackles FG Over $800m at Supreme Court, ALL AFRICA, Aug. 10, 2005, http://
www.allafrica.com.
35. Id.
VOL. 40, NO. 2
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 427
Switzerland, Nigeria, and the World Bank signed a Memorandum of Understanding for
the repatriation of an additional $290 million on September 27, 2005.36
2. UN Oil-for-Food Scandal
The Independent Inquiry Committee into the Iraq Oil-for-Food Program (IIC) released
its final report on October 27, 2005.17 The HC concluded that 2253 companies participated
in the fraud, totaling around $1.8 billion dollars. Because the HC has no judicial power, the
report lists the names of companies and individuals involved and leaves the process of
investigating and prosecuting participants up to their respective nations. Prosecutions in
the United States are already underway and investigations are starting around the world,
particularly in France and India. The HC stressed, however, that the Hussein regime earned
far more revenue-SI 1 billion-from illegal oil sales to neighboring countries than through
the kickback schemes.
IV. International Anti-Corruption Treaties and Public
International Organizations
There were several developments in ongoing efforts in treaty development, international
policy, and public international organizations, particularly in the Group of 8, the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the Summit of the Americas, and the Global Forum
on Fighting Corruption. Below are some brief highlights that are covered in more detail
on the Committee's website.
A. THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION
The UNCAC entered into force on December 14, 2005.38 The United States has not
yet ratified the convention, although the package has been transmitted to the Senate.3 9
B. MUTUAL EVALUATION MECHANISMS
1. The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption
The Committee of Experts of the Follow-Up Mechanism for the Inter-American Con-
vention Against Corruption4O accelerated its review efforts this year, issuing eleven first-
round compliance reports on the Bahamas, Canada, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Jamaica, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Trinidad & Tobago,
and the United States.41 The Committee also held meetings in March 2005 to discuss
36. Id.
37. Press Release, Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme, Illicit
Oil-for-Food Programme Payments of Nearly $2 Billion to Saddam Hussein; UIC Urges UN Reform, Oct. 27,
2005, available at http://www.iic-offp.org/documents/PressRelease2 70ct05.pdf.
38. U.N. Signatories, supra note 1.
39. For the ABA Report and Recommendations on the Convention, see SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT TO THE HOUSE DELEGATES, available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/
2005/annual/summaryofrecommendations/ 10.doc.
40. U.N. Signatories, supra note 1.
41. All the reports except those concerning the Bahamas, El Salvador, and St. Vincent & the Grenadines,
which are not yet public, are available from the Organization of American States, http://www.oas.org/juridico/
english/mec_ ron 1 _rep.htm.
SUMMER 2006
428 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
implementation of the No Safe Haven initiative, an agreement from the Special Summit
of the Americas in 2004, where all nations committed to deny safe haven to corrupt officials,
those who corrupt them, and their assets.
42
2. The Group of States Against Corruption
The Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) monitors observance of the Council
of Europe's Guiding Principles for the Fight against Corruption and implementation of
the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, the Civil Law Convention on Corruption,
and Recommendation R (2000) 10 on codes of conduct for public officials. In 2005,
GRECO issued reports on Albania, Bulgaria, Denmark, the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, Germany, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Romania, Spain, and Sweden.
3
3. The OECD Working Group on Bribery
The OECD Working Group on Bribery monitors implementation of the Convention
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.
The OECD Working Group issued one report on the adequacy of legislation, for Slovenia,
and reports on implementation of legislation for Belgium, Greece, HungaryJapan, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.-
V. Non-Governmental Organizations and
Business Associations
A. CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE ENTERPRISE
The Center for International Private Enterprises (CIPE) is a non-profit affiliate of the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce and one of the four core institutes of the National Endowment
for Democracy. CIPE's overall focus is on institutional reform on both the supply and
demand sides of corruption. CIPE partners work to create incentive structures that reward
ethical behavior and punish those who engage in corruption. Under CIPE's auspices, local
organizations abroad have been working to address corruption issues in their respective
countries. In Russia, the IiNDEM Foundation (Information Science for Democracy) con-
ducted extensive studies on sources of corruption and, in conjunction with the business
sector, developed the Business Owner's Guide: How to Oppose Corruption. In Colombia, the
Confederation of Colombian Chambers of Commerce is working to reduce private sector
corruption through the adoption of ethical standards and corporate governance mecha-
nisms. 45 In the Philippines, the Institute for Solidarity in Asia worked with local govern-
ments in eight major cities to improve governance mechanisms, increasing transparency
and reducing opportunities for public officials' discretion. 46 In Mozambique, the Commer-
42. Id.
43. All the reports except that on the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which is not public, are
available from GRECO, www.greco.coe.int/evaluations/Default.htm.
44. See generally, Organisation for Economic Co-operation & Development, Directorate for Financial &
Enterprise Affairs, Bribery in International Business, Ant-Bribery Convention, available at http://www.oecd.
org/department/0,2688,en-2649-34859 - 1 - 1,00.html(last visited Feb. 13, 2006).
45. CIPE Global Partners and Results, Colombian Confederation of Chambers of Commerce (Confecimar),
http://www.cipe.org/programs/global/partners/dispPartner.php?id = 121 (last visited Feb. 13, 2005).
46. Institute for Solidarity in Asia, Work with Cities: Public Governance System (PGS), http://www.isa
center.org/publicgovemancesystem.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2006).
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cial and Industrial Association of Sofala is raising awareness of widespread corruption, eval-
uating its causes and costs, and is working with the private sector to design concrete legal
and regulatory recommendations that tackle corruption at its roots.4' CIPE is also working
with Transparency International (TI) to develop an anti-bribery toolkit for small and me-
dium enterprises and compliance mechanisms for companies that have voluntarily sub-
scribed to TI's Business Principles for Countering Bribery.48
B. THE CORNER HOUSE
The Corner House is a United Kingdom-based research and advocacy group that focuses
on addressing how the U.K. government can combat corruption. It also monitors particular
cases of corruption involving U.K. companies and individuals. Early in 2005, the Corner
House uncovered information indicating that the U.K.'s Export Credits Guarantee Depart-
ment (ECGD) had weakened its anti-corruption procedures following extensive lobbying by
particular U.K. exporters. The Corner House took the ECGD to court and won a settlement,
whereby the ECGD agreed to fifll consultation on its anti-corruption procedures. 49
C. GLOBAL WITNESS
Global Witness, a non-governmental organization (NGO) that operates through a com-
bination of covert investigations and in-depth research, works to expose links between the
exploitation of natural resources, environmental destruction, and human rights abuses, par-
ticularly where such resources are used to fund and perpetuate conflict and corruption. 0
In 2005, Global Witness continued to press for revenues from natural resource extraction
in resource-rich developing countries to be managed in a transparent and equitable manner
in order to combat misappropriation of revenues from oil, gas, mining, and logging through
the Publish What You Pay Coalition; effective implementation of the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative, a multi-stakeholder initiative to deliver resource revenue transpar-
ency; and the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, the international agreement aimed
at preventing the trade in conflict diamonds. Global Witness also worked to expose cor-
ruption and illegal logging in the timber trade in Cambodia and other countries and to
coordinate ongoing campaigns to tackle corruption in the timber trade.
D. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) is a world business organization with
thousands of member companies and associations in around 130 countries. The ICC Anti-
Corruption Commission encourages self-regulation by enterprises in confronting issues of
extortion and bribery and provides business input into international initiatives to fight cor-
47. Commercial & Industrial Association of Sofala, About ACIS, http://www.acisofala.com/about-acisl.htm
(last visited Feb. 13, 2006).
48. CIPE, supra note 45; TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, BUSINESS PRINCIPLES FOR COUNTERING BRIBERY
(2002), available at http://www.transparency.org or http://www.sa-ind.org.
49. Susan Hawley, Submission to the ECGD Interim Response to the Public Consultation on the ECGD's Anti-
Bribery and Corruption Procedures Introduced in December 2004, THE CORNER HOUSE, http://www.thecorner
house.org.uk/item.shteml?x = 471570.s.
50. See generally, Global Witness, http://www.globalwitness.org (last visited Feb. 13, 2006).
SUMMER 2006
430 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
ruption.5' The ICC issued a revised version of its Rules of Conduct and Recommendations
to Combat Extortion and Bribery in October 2005.52 The 2005 Rules form the cornerstone
of the ICC's anti-corruption work, serving both as a tool for self-regulation by business and
as a plan of action for ICC cooperation with international organizations and governments
to combat extortion and bribery.
E. TRACE
TRACE is a non-profit business association that works with companies to improve their
anti-bribery programs while lowering the cost associated with compliance. TRACE un-
dertakes benchmarking research and disseminates the results to assist its member companies
to ensure that their policies are squarely within best practices. In 2005, TRACE initiated
a compliance library of anti-bribery policies for dissemination to small companies and com-
panies in emerging markets." The library enables these companies to benefit from the
expertise of multinationals with longstanding and tested programs. Due diligence reports
were made available at no cost to non-profit organizations working with third parties with
a goal of increasing transparency and enhancing anti-bribery compliance among NGOs.
TRACE also established a scholarship program, scheduled to take effect in 2006-2007 that
will enable students in emerging markets to undertake degree-level studies in the United
States with a strong corporate governance component. Finally, TRACE continued its anti-
bribery workshop series by holding half-day workshops that are open to the public and
cover topics such as the FCPA, international conventions, and local law.
F TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL
TI, with its network of almost ninety national chapters around the world, works with
governments, civil society, and the private sector to address domestic and international
corruption. 4 TI has developed assessment tools, including National Integrity Surveys, a
Corruption Barometer, and the 2005 TI Corruption Perceptions Index, which ranked a
record 159 countries according to perceived levels of corruption in the public sector. The
2005 edition of the annual TI Global Corruption Report"5 provided an overview of the
state of corruption around the world with a particular focus on the construction industry.
TI Advocacy efforts led the World Bank to implement an anti-bribery certification require-
ment for companies bidding for large public works projects. TI continues to press the
multilateral banks to require stronger transparency, audit, and other accountability require-
ments in bank-financed procurement and to harmonize their sanction and debarment mech-
anisms. TI has developed tools specifically for the private sector, including the Business
Principles for Countering Bribery. TI is also working to reduce extortion and bribery
through anti-corruption agreements and has contributed to the creation of follow-up mech-
51. See generally, ICC Anti-Corruption Commission, http://www.iccwbo.org/policy/anticorruption/?cookies
= no (last visited Feb. 13, 2006).
52. INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, COMM'N ON ANTI-CORRUPTION, COMBATING EXTORTION AND BRIBERY:
ICC RULES OF CONDUCT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2005), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/policy/anti
corruption/id4730/index.html.
53. See generally, TRACE International, http://www.traceintemational.org(last visited Feb. 13, 2006).
54. See generally, Transparancy International, http://www.transparancy.org (last visited Feb. 13, 2006).
55. TRANSPARANCY INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT (2006).
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anisms that promote enforcement. It is currently developing recommendations for the UN-
CAC State Parties and promoting transparency requirements in trade agreements and ar-
rangements such as APEC.
G. UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT
The U.N. Global Compact is an international multi-stakeholder initiative that brings
companies together with U.N. agencies, labor, and civil society to promote responsible
corporate citizenships6 More than 2500 companies from all regions of the world, inter-
national labor, and civil society organizations are engaged in the Global Compact, working
to advance ten voluntary universal principles in the areas of human rights, labor, the en-
vironment, and anti-corruption. The Global Compact Office has issued a first set of guide-
lines" advising on company action and plans to detail these recommendations, together
with the International Business Leaders Forum and TI, in a publication, Framework for
Action, which was released in December 2005. The Global Compact also facilitated and
initiated collective action by setting up a global multi-stakeholder working group. Re-
gional events were held jointly with the OECD, TI, and the New Partnership for Africa's
Development.
56. See generally, The United Nations Global Compact, http://www.un.org/Depts/ptd/global.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 13, 2006).
57. United Nations Global Compact, About the United Nations Global Compact, http://www.unglobal
compact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2006).
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